

Excerpts From Criticism of Arms Pact

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WASHINGTON, April 11 — Following are excerpts from a position paper issued today by the Coalition for Peace Through Strength explaining its objections to the second strategic arms limitation treaty with the Soviet Union:

SALT II deserves endorsement by the Congress and the people only if it can be shown conclusively that it can in fact contribute to the security of the United States by providing a strategic relationship that enhances the security of the United States, without reference to SALT III.

SALT II must not only pass the immediate test in regard to the balance of strategic power and mutual national security, it must also pass the test of international perception.

If the Soviets alone perceive of the agreement as our acceptance of their strategic superiority, then we can assume that the Soviets will become militarily more adventuresome and daring as they seek to extend their political control. We can expect coercive diplomacy and nuclear blackmail.

Fundamental Flaws

In addition to the technical flaws in SALT II, the agreement can be faulted on more basic counts which raise the issue of whether the U.S. should have ever attempted to reach a strategic arms control agreement with the Soviet Union.

First, SALT II, like SALT I, is based on faulty military doctrine and policy. There are a number of examples that deserve to be cited.

To begin with, the basic concept of parity as an acceptable strategic relationship is perpetuated in SALT II. But parity is a condition which places the United States at a significant disadvantage because of the differences in military strategy of the two nations.

Because the U.S. adheres to a strategy of deterrence and retaliation, it must have more weapons and highly survivable weapons. Yet, we have fewer weapons and less survivable weapons than the Soviet Union. The Soviets, on the other hand, do not follow a strategy of deterrence and retaliation. In their doctrinal writing, they spell out their belief in a strategy of first strike, and their weapons have been designed with that use in mind.

The basic strategy of deterrence also remains in SALT II. It is essential to realize that deterrence rests on credibility. That is, a potential attacker must believe that the U.S. retaliation will inflict intolerable damage and that the U.S. will, in fact, retaliate if attacked.

Deterioration of Imbalance

In fact, the United States deterrent is no longer credible. The reason is that after a Soviet first strike, the Soviets would still have enough strategic nuclear forces to destroy 60 percent of all Americans if the United States were to retaliate. On the other hand, the Soviets might lose no more than 4 percent of their population because of their active civil defense. It is most unlikely that any U.S. President would retaliate after a Soviet first strike if the Soviet response would kill 100 million to 150 million Americans.

Second, the United States is now in the most vulnerable condition in its history. We will be locked into strategic inferiority and overall military inferiority as a result of SALT. The imbalance in both strategic and conventional military power has grown worse during the period of SALT.

By virtue of the constraints on the U.S. provided by SALT II, it will be exceedingly costly for the U.S. to offset current Soviet advantages by adding to the capabilities of its existing weapons or developing new ones not constrained by the new agreement.

For example, the U.S. is not allowed to have heavy ICBM's. Therefore, it must seek technological improvements to its lighter ICBM's. But the very smallness of our weapons constrains the improvements that can be made.

Again, ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles are limited in their range by virtue of SALT, and the U.S. has agreed not to provide cruise missile technology to our NATO allies. The U.S. will have to offset that constraint by developing a different weapon — a more expensive process.

Impact on Atlantic Alliance

Third, one of the most serious flaws of the SALT process has been its effect on the NATO alliance.

Militarily, the U.S. relationship with NATO has been based on the principle that U.S. strategic forces would serve as an umbrella or shield over Western Europe. NATO leaders are deeply concerned and distressed that the United States is considering a treaty that would lock NATO's only real nuclear power into a position of inferiority.

NATO leaders also resent the provisions in the Protocol which forbid the installation of ground-launched cruise missiles in Western Europe for three years, and even deny NATO the right to benefit from U.S. cruise missile technology.

At present, NATO powers are concerned about what steps they should take to insure their survival in the absence of the U.S. strategic umbrella. One of their options is accommodation with the Communist bloc.

Shift in Soviet Aims Doubted

Fourth, the SALT process has failed basically to resolve the question of the fundamental difference in the political philosophies and the implication of those differences in regard to national security.

The proponents of SALT have argued that the philosophical differences between the two nations are not insurmountable, and that the benefits from détente and arms control would be of such magnitude that they would insure bargaining in good faith.

But nearly a decade of SALT and détente now proves that the Soviets have not decided in favor of friendship and cooperation.

Soviet leaders officially glory in the success of the war in Vietnam and in the economic difficulties that face the West. The only just peace that Soviet officials ever refer to is one in which there will be no more military or political challenge from capitalist-imperialist states. There is no evidence to support the position that Soviet leaders have forsaken Marxist-Leninist principles and the goal of the destruction of capitalism.

Recommendations

The new Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty is ill-conceived and places in jeopardy the security of the United States. It is not a genuine arms control agreement. It restricts the United States while permitting the Soviets to do what they had planned anyway.

An arms control agreement, to have any value, must be comprehensive, truly balanced, verifiable, and enforceable. SALT II meets none of these tests.

The SALT I interim agreement, in which the United States agreed to Soviet strategic superiority, has technically run its course. In order to permit the U.S. to have an adequate defense, we recommend that SALT I not be renewed. We also recommend that the United States now terminate the SALT I ABM Treaty so that it can defend its citizens against Soviet missiles.

For some 24 postwar years the United States provided for its security without SALT. SALT agreements cannot be claimed as indispensable to our security. Indeed, the record clearly shows that the United States is less secure today than it was when the SALT process began over nine years ago.

In recommending that SALT II be re-

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jected and that SALT I not be renewed, we are not suggesting that diplomatic efforts aimed at arms control be terminated. However, Soviet and American security interests and political objectives are so disparate that new negotiations must be based on totally different principles than those which have guided the parties so far.

If SALT II is ratified by the Senate, the cost of regaining an adequate defense would be vastly increased because the least expensive ways to rebuild our strategic strength will not be permitted. And if SALT II is ratified, the likelihood of the United States' taking the necessary steps for its own survival is sharply reduced.

The euphoria always generated in the United States by signing a treaty, combined with the higher cost to rebuild our strategic forces under a SALT II, might well produce even further cutbacks as was the case after SALT I. Thus, ratification of SALT II would amount to a further act of phased surrender.